

**Title:** Controlling Weighted Voting Games by Deleting or Adding Players with or without Changing the Quota

**Authors:** Joanna Kaczmarek and Jörg Rothe

**Abstract:** Weighted voting games are a well-studied class of succinct simple games that can be used to model collective decision-making in, e.g., legislative bodies such as parliaments and shareholder voting. Power indices [5, 10, 23, 28] are used to measure the influence of players in weighted voting games. In such games, it has been studied how a distinguished player's power can be changed, e.g., by merging or splitting players (the latter is a.k.a. false-name manipulation) [2, 24], by changing the quota [31], or via structural control by adding or deleting players [25]. We continue the work on the structural control initiated by Rey and Rothe [25] by solving some of their open problems. In addition, we also modify their model to a more realistic setting in which the quota is indirectly changed during the addition or deletion of players (in a different sense than that of Zuckerman et al. [31] who manipulate the quota directly without changing players' set), and we study the corresponding problems in terms of their computational complexity.